The term Acintya is generally confused with something which is not logically comprehensible or which is inconceivable, but neither of these understandings is completely correct. The question regarding what is acintya, what is the actual meaning of the term, and what do the Chaitanyites mean by acintya, all such questions are being addressed in the following brief article it is presented in question and answer format, trying to put together all the possible doubts that could be raised regarding the term.
Doubt 1. If pramāṇa must lead to jñāna-paryavasāna (culmination in knowable cognition), then how can śāstra be considered a valid pramāṇa if it leads to knowledge of something acintya (incomprehensible), like bhedābheda? Doesn’t this make it a case of apramāṇa-janita-jñāna (pseudo-knowledge)?
Response 1. Śāstra is indeed the valid pramāṇa (svataḥ-pramāṇa). It itself declares that Brahman cannot be known through (doṣa-yukta) pratyakṣa or anumāna, but only through śabda (revealed word) i.e., the words of shastra (Vedas, Upanishads, Itihasas, Bhagavatam, other Puranas, etc.) The object to be known, i.e. Brahman, is not bheda and abheda (difference and non-difference), but it is bhinna and abhinna (different and non-different) from its śaktis. This bheda and abheda (difference and non-difference) of Brahman and its shaktis exist simultaneously. It is this simultaneous bheda and abheda of Brahman and its shaktis that is achintya (incomprehensible) by tarka (logical reasoning). According to tarka, if a thing is hot to the touch of a person, it cannot be cold to his touch at the same time. In the same way, if Brahman is not the doer of activities (niṣkriya), it cannot be the doer of activities at the same time. But, because the shastra mentions Brahman both as the non-doer as well as the doer of activities, both these points have to be accepted as true. Because both these attributes, non-doership and doership, cannot exist at the same time in Brahman according to tarka, Brahman is incomprehensible (acintya) through tarka. Thus, through arthāpatti pramāṇa (deductive logic) one must accept that Brahman has some incomprehensible capability (acintya-śakti) by which it is simultaneously the non-doer and the doer. This acintya-śakti is mentioned by Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself in the Bhagavad Gītā 9.5 where he says “paśya me yogam aiśvaram”, behold my godly capacity”. In Gita 9.4-5, he says that all beings are present within him and also that all beings are not present in him. This is not logical. Therefore, Kṛṣṇa says that he has such power (yogam aiśvaram) that he possesses these mutually contrary attributes at the same time.
Thus, Brahman is not completely incomprehensible (acintya). Brahman is incomprehensible through tarka but is comprehensible through śāstra. It is śāstra that says that Brahman has incomprehensible ability (acintya-śakti) by which he possesses mutually contrary attributes.
Thus, because this understanding is based on śāstra, this does not fall into apramāṇa-janita-jñāna (pseudo knowledge).
Doubt 2. If bheda and abheda are real and simultaneous, but declared achintya, does this not incur viṣayānupalabdhi doṣa (fault of unknowability)? Don’t they lack a definable lakṣaṇa and thus lack epistemic status?
Response 2. We do not claim that bheda and abheda cannot be cognised—only that they cannot be logically reconciled. Indeed, they can be cognised as was the case in Vyāsa samādhī described in Bhāgavatam and also the various cognitions about Brahman described in śāstra (as experienced by various vidvat-janas/siddhas). Bheda and Abheda’s simultaneous presence in the relationship between Brahman and His śaktis can be grasped through śabda but not through tarka. Therefore, there is no viṣaya-anupalabdhi doṣa. The lakṣaṇa of bheda and abheda is established: they are ontological relations supported by scriptural statements and not merely speculative constructs. Thus, they possess epistemic status. Regarding even ordinary entities like fire, it possesses the two powers to produce heat and light as effects which are two distinct cognitions in the same fire-substratum. Moreover, the phenomenon of śakti-stambhana, observed when fire’s ability to burn comes to a halt by the influence of mantras or certain gems, also negates kevala-abheda(absolute abheda) between Fire and it’s burning potency. However, the phenomena of burning, heat, and light production are not separate entities that are other than the fire’s existence-this negates kevala-bheda. Hence, even from the perception of ordinary entities and phenomena associated with them, śakti as a dharma of the vastu must be posited by
‘kāryānyathānupapatti'[i.e., the impossibility of the effect (kārya) being explained in any other way (anyathā) other than this], and the resulting implication of the simultaneity in the cognitions of bheda and abheda between a substance and it’s śaktis is also to be accepted even if it be non-reconcilable by standalone tarka.
Doubt 3. When you say bheda and abheda are both real and acintya, and that they exist in a single ontological locus (i.e., Brahman or the Brahman–śakti relationship), then it collapses viṣayatva (objecthood). Unless one is the viśeṣaṇa (qualia) and the other the viśeṣya (qualificandum), this contradiction cannot be resolved. But since such a contradictory viśeṣaṇa–viśeṣya sambandha is also impossible, your doctrine of achintya collapses into śūnyatā (emptiness), not metaphysics.”
Response 3: This is not valid because you are presenting logical reasoning (tarka) which has already been established to be non-applicable regarding understanding the nature of Brahman. Furthermore, it is not that we are propounding absolute Bheda and absolute Abheda in the same locus. But we are only propounding the simultaneity of the experience of Bheda and Abheda(bheda pratīti and abheda pratīti) vis-a-vis śakti(s) and the Svarūpa of Śaktimān. This is due to inability in the conceptualisation of Shakti as completely distinct from the Svarūpa of Saktimān, leading to Abheda-pratīti. Similarly there is inability to conceptualise śakti as completely distinction-less from the Svarūpa of Śaktimān, leading to Bheda-pratīti, which leads us to accept simultaneity of Bheda and Abheda of Śakti and Śaktimān. This experience of Bheda and Abheda is Acintya (experienced, though not reconcilable through purely logical means in case of even ordinary substances and associated phenomena: e.g. Fire vis-a-vis its power to produce heat and its power to produce light; But in the case of Brahman, Bhedābheda of Brahman’s svarupa and śaktis is experienced through nirdoṣa-vaiduṣa-pratyakṣa arrived through by sāstra-janita-jñāna and upāsanā).
Doubt 4. If śāstra is pramāṇa, why use tarka at all? And if you use tarka to arrive at acintya, how can you then disallow scrutiny by tarka? Isn’t this inconsistent?
Response 4. We do not reject tarka entirely. Tarka is used in service of śāstra, as an anukūla-tarka (favourable reasoning), not as an independent means to grasp Brahman or go against its natural meaning arrived through proper tātparya nirṇaya vicāra. No amount of logic can effectively prove the existence of the jīvātmā, let alone the existence and attributes of Brahman. It is for this reason that the Brahma Sūtra 1.5 says tarkāpratiṣṭḥanāt: Because logical reasoning is inconclusive [in understanding Brahman]. Mimāṁsā’s use of tarka is for interpreting śāstra, not overruling it. Therefore, using tarka to explain why śāstra must be accepted (e.g., inference to posit acintya-śakti, which is nevertheless also revealed in śāstra) does not mean tarka can invalidate what śāstra says.
Doubt 5. If Bhagavān is in an ontological state of bhedābheda, how does this behave in the three states of experience: jāgrat (waking), svapna (dream), and suṣupti (deep sleep)? Doesn’t this lead to avasthā-traya-avyavasthā-doṣa (fault of state-incoherence)?
Response 5. Bhagavān is eternally beyond the three states—He is ever in turīya (the transcendent state). It is only the bound jīva (part of taṭasthā-śakti) who passes through these states. Since the bhedābheda relation applies between Brahman and His śaktis (not between Bhagavān and His own experiences in the three states), there is no avasthā-traya-doṣa. “The eternal jīvas are considered to be parts of the Paramātmā because they are constituted of the marginal potency (taṭasthā śakti) of the Paramātmā. The Paramātmā without modifying/abandoning His own essential nature(svarūpa) appears by actualizing His marginal potency, which is not distinguishable as a separate entity from His essential nature, as the jīvas. This is elaborated in Bhagavat Sandarbha (Anuccheda 17): “Through his marginal potency, he (Paramātmā) exists as the pure jīvas constituted of Consciousness.” The potency of an entity is simultaneously one with and also appears distinctly from that entity’s essential nature. Thus, it is the Paramātmā Himself that exists in the form of his marginal potency that includes all the jīvas. This is true for every perception of disparate units since Paramātmā is the only real existent that appears to be perceived as the empirical single unit in any mental cognition, as explained in Paramātma sandarbha(Anuccheda 65).
Doubt 6. Is saying that bhedābheda is acintya (supralogical) and only known through śāstra not self-defeating? Doesn’t it contradict pramāṇa-tattva if reality cannot be grasped at all logically?
Response 6. To say that bhedābheda of Brahman and its saktis is transrational and known only through śāstra is not at all a contradiction. If Brahman and its nature and its relationship with its śaktis was known through logic then there would be no need of śāstra. Some things are known only through śāstra and never by plain logical reasoning. Accepting śabda-pramāṇa and faultless perception issuing forth from shastrajñāna and realisation through upāsanā as autonomous is foundational to Vedānta. If you think that śāstra is dependent on independent logical reasoning or (mundane and faulty) perception when Brahman is the viṣaya then you do not accept the independence of śabda pramāṇa. To accept this supremacy of śāstra is a mandatory requirement to gain knowledge of ātmā-tattva.
Doubt 7. Doesn’t affirming real contradictions in Brahman violate viṣayatva, making it impossible for śāstra to describe it as a valid object of knowledge?
Response 7. Contradictions are problematic only from the standpoint of standalone tarka. Śāstra glorifies Bhagavān’s simultaneous possession of seemingly contradictory attributes—being sarvavyāpī yet tad-anāśrita (Gītā 9.4–5), being puruṣa and nirguṇa, etc. These are not real contradictions, but expressions of Bhagavān’s acintya-śakti. Thus, Brahman retains viṣayatva for śabda-pramāṇa. Additionally, Bheda and Abheda are not two contradictory vastus staying in one locus but merely apprehensions within the substratum of Brahman that we are not able to reconcile in a standalone logical manner but accept due to śāstra pramāṇa and the nirdoṣa-vaiduṣa-pratyakṣa described therein.
Doubt 8. Doesn’t saying bhedābheda is literal and acintya violate śabda-vṛtti rules like abhidhā and lakṣaṇā? Doesn’t this cause lakṣaṇa-niyamābhāva-doṣa (violation of semantic constraints)?
Response 8. No, because we do not resort to lakṣaṇā (secondary meaning) to understand bhedābheda sambandha of the Svarūpa of Śaktimān with Its Śakti’s. We take abhidhā-vṛtti—direct semantic meaning of śāstra—which states that Brahman is both different and non-different from His śaktis. We have already indicated what we mean when we use the term ‘Bhedābheda’ in Response 3.
Doubt 9. If acintya-bhedābheda is neither seen nor inferred, and supposedly not graspable by śabda due to violating its rules, is it not negated by anupalabdhi-pramāṇa (non-perception as a proof of non-existence)?
Response 9. Not at all. Śāstra teaches acintya-bhedābheda clearly—especially in the Śrīmad Bhāgavatam and the Sandarbhas+Sarva-samvādinī of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī expands and brings this out clearly . It is not inferred, but perceived even in the mundane examples like fire vis-a-vis it’s potency to produce heat and potency to produce light. And for Brahman, it is directly revealed (śabda-pramāṇa) which includes nirdoṣa-vaiduṣa-pratyakṣa like that of Vyāsa etc. Under proper guidance, one can understand how śāstra meaningfully teaches this doctrine. Therefore, it is not subject to negation by anupalabdhi.
Doubt 10. If acintya means confounding logic, and śāstra is meant to yield intelligible knowledge, does this not make śāstra figurative and destroy its prāmāṇya?
Response 10. No. The purpose of śāstra is not to confirm our logical expectations but to reveal transcendental truth. Śāstra indeed aims to transcend the buddhi-based plane and guide one to realisation of the self (ātma-tattva). The simultaneous difference and non-difference in Brahman’s relation with His śaktis is not logically contradictory in the absolute sense—it is transrational (acintya). Since śāstra testifies to this, it does not become pramāṇa-abhāsa, nor does it become figurative. It continues to be śabda-pramāṇa, the highest means of knowledge for Brahman and this is supplemented by the description of the Advaya Parama-tattva inclusive of parts in the form of śaktis and their expressions by nirdoṣa-śāstra-janita vaiduṣa pratyakṣa like that of Vyāsa.
Author
Paras Mehta
PhD Research Scholar
M.A. Sanskrit
Chaitanya Siddhanta Parishad 