In Indian philosophy, Khyātivāda refers to theories of error or theories of illusion/misperception. The word “Khyāti” means appearance or perception, and these theories attempt to explain how and why errors in perception and understanding occur. In this context Sri Jiva Goswami established his own school of Khyāti known as Acintya Khyātivāda (Supralogical Theory of Perceptual Error). We will explore in the technical details of this theory.

While explaining the phrase “ विकल्पः ख्यातिवादिनाम् ” of SB 11.16.24 , Sri Jiva Goswami says: “… ते च विकल्पा मम शक्तिमया एवेति न परस्परम् अद्यापि व्युच्छिद्यन्ते , ततस्तत् प्रतिपाद्यस्य शक्तेश्चाचिन्त्यत्वं विज्ञाप्यतन्मयत्वात् सर्वत्र अचिन्त्यख्यातित्वम् एव प्रतिपादितम् ”(Krama Sandarbha).

It is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of the expression: “अचिन्त्य-ख्यातित्वम् ” here.

It may mean that all the “vikalpas”, i.e., the different conflicting “khyāti-vādas” are to be accepted together with a view to making amends for the deficiencies of the one by the others;

Or it may mean that the logical antipodes must fraternise to explain an invalid cognition.

We shall presently see, while going into details, that Sri Jīva has a predeliction for “Anyathā-khyāti” mixed with a semblance of “Anirvacanīya-khyāti”(if that term be at all applicable here), in the field of epistemological error; still his view may be called “acintya-khyāti” in the sense that all kinds of apprehension(and not only the invalid ones) are “acintya” from the standpoint of logical categorisation(C.f. शक्तयः सर्वभावानाम् अचिन्त्य-ज्ञान-गोचराः -Vishnu Purana).

Three pre-conditions of error accepted by Sri Jiva Goswami have been listed:

1. Error pertains to determinate cognition and to a “savisheṣa” entity. It does not pertain to indeterminate cognition and to an entity devoid of all characterization(“nirvisheṣa” entity). [ निर्विकल्प-प्रत्यये भ्रमाभावात् सविशेषे एव प्रवर्तते ]
2. That alone may be superimposed(on something else) which has an existence somewhere. [ अन्यत्र-सिद्धस्य वस्तुन एव अन्यत्रारोपो मिथ्या खपुष्पादेरारोपासम्भवात् ]
3. Error generally thrives on similarity.

From the first pre-condition(1), it follows that the attributeless Brahman of the Kevala-advaita conception cannot be the object of error.

The second pre-condition(2) coupled with the third pre-condition(3) implies that the error depends upon superimposition of an entity which is existent (in another locus) upon another entity through cognition of similarity.

An absolutely non-existent entity like the “sky-flower” or “hare’s horn” cannot be superimposed anywhere.

The perception of a mirage, is due to the awakening through similarity, of the psychosis(mind), having the form of water(i.e., samskāra in the form of water), which was generated previously through the perception of water that lay so long latent.

So, water is not an utter non-existent entity; The “psychosis in the form of water”, which is a recollection of previous experience of water is , and the mirage which has similarity in appearance to water are also not non-existent(i.e., not mithyā).

But the superimposition in identity is indeed “mithyā” [ किन्तु तदभेदेन आरोप एव अयथार्थत्वात् मिथ्या ].

So, there is no entitative falsity; but, falsity pertains only to superimposition [ तस्मात् वस्तुतस्तु न क्वचिदपि मिथ्यात्वम् ].

So, according to Sri Jīva, there is no objective falsity, but mere subjective falsity.

He does not however, hesitate to assert that superimposition of (say) a “silver”, which exists elsewhere, is indeed possible in a locus(say, a nacre) where it is really not present, in all three phases of time(past, present and future) [ ‘यत्र हि यन्नास्ति किन्तु अन्यत्रैव दृश्यते तत्रैव तदारोपः सिद्धः’ and ‘यद्यपि तस्य त्रिकालमेव सोऽर्थो नास्ति’ ].

So, the “Silver (apprehended) in the locus of the nacre” is “mithyā”, i.e., ‘asat’ or non-existent.

The nacre-silver has mere cognitional existence(pratītika-mātra-sattāka), but has no causal efficiency to produce an action or event(artha-kriyā-kāritva).

According to Sri Jīva, that alone is real which may be apprehended and may prompt purposive activity(i.e., has causal efficiency to produce an event or action). [शुक्त्यादावेव प्रातीतिक-मात्र-सत्ताकं रजतादिकं मृषा । अन्यत्र यत्र उभयं प्रतीतिम् अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं च युनक्ति भजते तत्र न तथा मृषेति।].

The points to be noted here are the following:

1. Sri Jīva uses the word “mithyā” in the sense of “asat”(non-existent); though sometimes, he may doubtfully seem to use it in the Kevala-advaitic sense of “sad-asat-bhinnam, anirvacanīyatvam”. However, it really seems to be in the sense of “svātantryeṇa anirūpya” (unascertainability as an independent entity(from Paramātma)) [ “अतो देहादेः(ऐक्यबुद्ध्यालम्बनरूपम्) स्वातन्त्र्येणावस्थितिर्मृषैव इति।” and “तस्मादैक्यबुद्ध्यालम्बनरूपं यत् प्रतीयते तत् सर्वत्र परमात्मलक्षणं सर्वकारणं वस्तु एव इति।” (P.S. 64 and 65)] .
2. The nacre-silver is “pratīti-mātra-sattākam”, i.e., it merely has “apprehensional existence” and that too, only within the locus of the nacre (शुक्त्यादावेव).
3. Outside the locus of the nacre, however, silver has objective existence. It is not “pratīti-samaya-sattāka”(existence only at the moment of apprehension) as the Kevala-advaitins aver.

So, according to Sri Jīva, there is no question of alternating negation of existence and non-existence of the silver.

Indeed, he clearly asserts that the nacre-silver doesnot arise(i.e., it is not created) from the nacre, but is superimposed upon it. [ रजतं न शुक्त्युत्थम् किन्तु तस्मिन् अध्यस्तम् एव ].

Dream-objects also are not creations; nor are they “mithyā” in the Kevala-advaitic sense.

Even the dream-cognition of being beheaded is nothing but the superimposition by the “Māyā-shakti” of Paramātma upon the cogniser of a similar situation that occured elsewhere. [स्वप्नावस्थायां जीवेन स्वशिरश्छेदनादिकोऽतीवासम्भवोऽर्थः प्रतीयते। न हि तस्य शिरश्छिन्नं, न तु वा स्वशिरश्छेदं कोऽपि पश्येत्। किन्तु भगवन्मायैवान्यत्रसिद्धं तद्रूपमर्थं तस्मिन्नारोपयतीति, “मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्” [ब्र.सू. ३.२.३] इति न्यायेन॥]

The world is neither “mithyā” in the Kevala-advaitic sense, nor “asat”(i.e., completely non-existent) but is merely transistory, though real.

So, according to Sri Jīva, the world is not “mithyā”, nor is “Jīvahood” similarly “mithyā” in the Kevala-advaitic sense.

Coming back to the example of the nacre-silver; the point needs to be stated once again in clear terms that the ‘nacre-silver’ by itself is “mithyā” only in the sense of “asat”.

While, the ‘superimposition of silver upon nacre’ here is ‘mithyā’ similar to the sense accepted in Kevala-advaita.

Hence, this theory partly adopts an intermixture of “Anyathā-khyāti”, “Asat-khyāti” and a semblance of “Anirvacanīya-khyāti”.

Here, the cognition of superimposition resembles “anirvacanīyatvam” , though the cognitum(apprehension of the error-object) is not so, being clearly “asat”.

However, the apprehension of the “world”, “the body” and “the self” etc. are “mithyā” in a deep metaphysical sense:

Paramātma is different from the world, the jīvas etc., but the world and jīvas are also non-different from Him, being the actualisation of His potencies.

So, when the latter two are cognized as different from and independent of Paramātma, such cognition is “mithyā”. Or rather, it is the ‘cognition of such entities as independent of Paramātma’ which is “mithyā”(false).

But, this “mithyātva” means “unascertain-ability as an independent entity”, i.e., “acintyatvaṃ” [अतो देहादेः(ऐक्यबुद्ध्यालम्बनरूपम्) स्वातन्त्र्येणावस्थितिर्मृषैव इति।].

It is from this metaphysical standpoint that one may speak of “Acintya-khyāti” in all spheres of human experience.

In the narrow field of errors, “Acintya-khyāti” is applicable in the sense that all these errors are due to “Māyā”(or rather vikṣepātmika function of Māyā), a real potency of Paramātma, which baffles us and is beyond our thinking. [या च नयेन तर्केण विरुद्ध्यते तर्कातीततया सेयमपि अचिन्त्या]